iRadio, as the service has been called by some, will reportedly mimic the functionality of Pandora, offering users continuous streaming with limited interactivity. The company is negotiating directly with record labels as opposed to relying on the type of compulsory licenses that are at the core of Pandora’s business model. That means that Apple might offer its users slightly more functionality and fewer restrictions when it comes to music selection and song skipping.

However, iRadio won’t offer on-demand streaming of complete albums like users have come to expect from full-blown music subscription services like Spotify and Rdio. That’s because the Spotify model directly competes with Apple’s music download business. Pandora, on the other hand, actually helps Apple sell more music.

The NPD Group noted Tuesday that 38 percent of U.S. consumers still think it’s important to own their own music. However, among Pandora users, that number was even higher. Here’s how NPD put it in its press release:

“Among consumers who listened to music on Pandora and other free music-streaming services, 41 percent reported that owning music was important to them; in fact, many free streamers attributed buying more downloads to their discovery on a radio or via an on-demand service.”

The company didn’t make any data available about people who pay for a streaming subscription, but I wouldn’t be surprised to see significantly lower interest in music ownership amongst users who pay for unlimited access.

That’s why it’s smart for Apple to invest in iRadio. The goal is not to kill Pandora, but to actually bring that type of radio service to more users, and keep them from switching to a full-blown access model. In other words: It’s not about Pandora, and all about Spotify.

According to figures reported by CNET and confirmed by Spotify, the company now has 24 million active users and 6 million paying subscribers across the world. Spotify is also growing rapidly in the United States, where it arrived in July 0f 2011 and is this week hosting musicians at its “Spotify House” at the SXSW festival in Austin, Texas.

Despite the hype, the underlying economics of Spotify’s business model remain uncertain. The service is beholden to musicians and studios, which request a 70 percent cut, and it must contend with a growing list of competitors that include Pandora, Rdio and SoundCloud. Meanwhile, YouTube is expected to launch a subscription service of its own in coming months and even Apple is expected to get into the streaming game too.

This competition validates the underlying premise of Spotify — that people want access to a giant catalog of music instead of buying it piecemeal through iTunes — but the arrival of deep-pocketed rivals may hurt Spotify’s ability to compete in the longterm.

Rdio, just as a refresher, is a subscription service that tries to set itself apart from market leader Spotify with a different take on social music curation. The company offers limited free music for up to six months, but doesn’t do ads.

That’s different from Spotify, which launched a free, ad-supported mobile radio service in the U.S. last summer. The company is now looking to expand its free mobile tier to all of its 17 territories, Bloomberg reported Monday. Deals for such an offering are still under negotiation, but Spotify could start with its free streaming as early as April.

Spotify’s free mobile service is more like Pandora, offering users limited interactivity with the hopes that some are going to subscribe to a full-service offering. And the interest in music subscriptions is definitely growing: Industry association IFPI’s latest Digital Music report (PDF) claims that worldwide, 20 million consumers paid for music subscriptions in 2012. And in Europe, subscription services made up for 20 percent of all digital music revenues during that time period.

That number was largely driven by a strong showing in Northern Europe, which is Spotify’s home turf – but services like Rdio seem to bet that this success story can be repeated in countries like Austria as well.

Those quarterly results were mixed: for the company’s fiscal Q4 2013, which ended in January, Pandora clocked $125 million in revenue during that quarter, compared to $81.3 million during its fiscal Q4 2012. However, losses also grew substantially to $14.4 million, compared to $8.1 million a year ago. For its fiscal FY 2013, Pandora incurred losses of $37.7 million, which is up significantly from the $19.9 million it incurred in its fiscal FY 2012.

Pandora has long struggled with finding a business model that matches its high licensing costs. The company spent 61 percent of its revenue last year on music licensing, and it has repeatedly pushed to lower the rates it has to pay rights holders.

The site, which lets people share their favorite music track-by-track, has proven an underground hit online less than a year after launching publicly: more than 100,000 users have signed up, sharing over 900,000 songs. But the London-based service was started as a pet project inside music data company The Echo Nest — and it’s now exploring what happens next.

“Up until this point we’ve been incubated by The EchoNest, but now we’re looking at options for spinning out in our own right,” creator Matthew Ogle told me.

It’s been an unusual course for This Is My Jam so far — in fact, Ogle says that the site “wasn’t supposed to happen for a whole bunch of reasons”. Chief among them? The fact he’d decided to move out of the online music industry after leaving his role as head of web product at Last.fm back in 2010.

“Despite swearing off online music forever, in less than a year I’d been convinced by the awesome folks at The Echo Nest that we could do some cool stuff together,” he says. “They didn’t hire me to make Jam, they hired me in a dual role to be their man in Europe — evangelizing at hackdays, talking to developers — and also to be a kind of internal product skunkworks, prototyping stuff based on new APIs and using that to spark new direction that The Echo Nest could be going with their data.”

But when it turned out that Jam, an idea he’d been throwing for a while, had more going for it than the other skunkworks proposals, Ogle’s focus switched and the parent company funded development. Jam now has four full-time staff, as Ogle brought on former Last.fm refugee Hannah Donovan, and engineers Ralph Cowling and Andreas Jansson.

The failure of frictionless

The site is one of my favorite services to have launched in the last year or two, and it’s one I’ve found myself going back to more often than I expected. Posting your favorite tracks and browsing the tracks of others turns the site into a curious mixture of status update and radio station. It’s a great tool for telling people about the music you like — lots of people use it to showcase their mood, for example. But it’s also a treasure trove of music, allowing you to dig around in the tastes of others. Because it’s almost exclusively focused on what people are listening to now, it has a real-time quality to it… yet the conscious decision that goes into making your choice means that the end result is more personal than Pandora but way more curated than Spotify’s frictionless sharing.

In fact, says Ogle, the failure of frictionless sharing to provide anything more than a fleeting dip into a raging river of data left an interesting gap for Jam to fill.

“I couldn’t quite believe that in 2011 that social song sharing wasn’t just a solved problem,” he explains. “One thing that we talked about at last.fm a lot — you know that amazing moment in real life when someone grabs you and say ‘you have to hear this song, check it out’ and they put the headphones in your ears or put a record on. Anyone who cares about music even a little bit has had that moment.”

“We’re in this golden age of social media, we’re always connected to all of our friends at all times, and there’s big data around music — Spotify and Facebook have basically taken scrobbling to the mainstream — [so] there should be more ways than ever for me to go ‘I want to hear some new tunes, what are my friends listening to?’ and get good stuff… not just whatever they happened to accidentally listen to on Spotify. Conversely there was no way for me to share a song that people would still see five hours later. Everything was being forced in real-time.”

Curation/exploration

Donovan, who heads up the site’s design, points out that isn’t just vanity that drives — the performative aspect of social media where you are showing off your taste to others — but a sort of shared curation where users collaborate to uncover interesting tracks, point to classics or dig up forgotten material.

“This was actually really cool when we discovered this happening, because there’s no other music service on the internet where it’s OK to have old stuff mixed in too,” she says. “Either everything is organized around the music data thing — singles live inside albums that live inside artists — or it’s promotional in some respect, in which case they’re always pushing the latest album or the latest single that just came out.”

“On top of that I think there’s something around our culture today that’s driven by newness, and how things on the internet always have to be the latest and the newest. I heard somebody say when you’re curating something, you don’t necessarily want just the latest or the newest, you want to dig up old things that were really great and put them back in context alongside newer things, or mixed in with other stuff. That’s the job of the curator and that’s what makes it really enjoyable for the user or the observer.”

“We thought about curation a lot when we were starting Jam. The overall effect is that our users became the curators of this music, and we wound up with this lovely space where you could get Prince and Fleetwood Mac right next to the latest trendy pop band.”

That is, in turn, helping the product develop further forward. Coming very soon are some new additions to the site’s Explore pages, which will offer up some new ways for users to browse the site. Explore categories will include “Breaking” (songs that have been jammed for the first time recently, and subsequently shared), “Rare” (songs that have been jammed only once), and another one that lists just the first jams of newly-registered users. Although it could act as a way for users to introduce themselves to the service, the first jams could also become a sort of Greatest Hits package.

“A lot of people sign up and start with their favorite song of all time,” says Ogle.

As a bill attempting to lower the royalty rates paid to artists by streaming music services such as Pandora works its way through Congress, Keating took to her Tumblr blog last week and offered a solution that both sides should listen to, but won’t. You might have read about her stance in Billboard or ITworld already, or perhaps on Slashdot. If you haven’t, here it is in a nutshell, from Keating’s blog: “The law only demands I be paid in money, which at this point in my career is not as valuable as information. I’d rather be paid in data.”

Leaving aside the entire issue about royalties and copyright (and privacy policies), her statement is still powerful. Keating understands that in order to prosper in a world of digital music — just like in the world of e-commerce, digital publishing, you name it — information is power. The names, email address and perhaps mobile numbers of individuals listening to her music are nice, clean data that Keating could use with little to no analytic effort by reaching out to fans when a new tour is coming to town or a new album drops.

Actually, Keating noted in a subsequent blog post on Tuesday that even less-personal data can have a material impact on a performer’s bottom line. Using postal code data provide to her from iTunes sales, she’s able to plan tours more efficiently because she knows, or can make a safe assumption, that she has paying fans in certain cities.

Touring and merchandise sales remain most artists’ primary means of income, and the current royalty rate of $.0011 per play doesn’t add up fast (at least according to Keating’s math), so it’s easy to see why she — and probably many other up-and-coming or niche performers — would rather have the data that properties like Pandora almost certainly have.

And whether Keating knows it or not, the idea of using data as a substitute for money extends beyond web radio stations and musicians arguing about royalties. A couple weeks ago, I highlighted a handful of attempts to convince consumers to hand over, in exchange for cash rewards or product discounts, valuable data that advertisers can’t collect by tracking their online activity. This is data such as recent and future purchases, personal interests, your web-surfing habits and where you shop in the physical world.

Just like Keating is willing to forgo one-tenth of one cent per play (real money, even if not a lot) in exchange for data, these brands are willing to trade cash or something like it for data they don’t have to run through a Hadoop cluster and seven segmentation algorithms before they can tie it to a real person. They know they have to give a little bit in order to improve upon the status quo that’s good, but not nearly good enough for their purposes.

Previously, the notion that data is the currency of the web meant users gave away their behavior data to web sites in exchange for free services. Slowly but surely, however, that notion seems to be evolving. Maybe Zoë Keating wants data in lieu of royalties for the privilege of streaming her music, and maybe a web site wants my offline location data enough to give me a gift card worth enough that I’d hand it over. Either way, it’s all about the realization that some data is worth its weight — and then some — in cold, hard cash.

Feature image courtesy of Flickr user eschipul.

We do — that was that state of digital media when paidContent launched in 2002. Other weird things were happening back then too: People still got much of their news from television and newspapers, and they learned about major events after they had already happened.

There have been some huge shifts since 2002: Tablets and smartphones are now ubiquitous, lots of people read on their digital devices, and just about everyone is part of a social network or three. This summer is the tenth anniversary of our launch. In an effort to gain some perspective on the past decade in digital media, I’ve been reading back through paidContent’s archives — a collection of over 80,000 posts.

Since I was only a freshman in college when paidContent came to life, I often didn’t know, as I read through the stories from the early days, how things had begun or how they turned out. As I watched them unfold, I wanted to grab our readers’ arms and give them advice (“Don’t buy that Zune!” “Invest in Facebook!” “Go for the good Twitter handle now!”). But I also realized how difficult it is to predict success.

Some takeaways from my trip through the archives:  Some companies — AOL and Yahoo come to mind — have been consistently bad at predicting what consumers want. And a couple of companies, namely Apple and Amazon, have been very good at it. Also, being a native digital company helps, but it’s no guarantee of success (what up, MySpace?). And after all these years, it’s still not clear what content customers will pay for, or how much they’ll pay.

Streaming and Moviebeaming

What do analysts, CEOs and bloggers have in common? None of us can predict the future. Roger Ebert joked in 2002 that “on-demand streaming movies on the Web, like HDTV, are five years in the future — and will be for at least another 10 years.”

If Disney’s Moviebeam had been the only game in town, Ebert probably would have been right. When it launched in three cities in 2003, customers paid $6.99 a month to use a device that could hold 100 movies and plugged into the back of a TV set. They also had to pay for each movie they watched– billing was done via the phone line. The company went through various unsuccessful iterations before India’s Valuable Group bought it in 2008. It was never heard from again.

Netflix almost went down the same road. It had a plan to release a Moviebeam-like “proprietary set-top box with an Internet connection that could download movies overnight.” But instead, it decided to forge ahead with streaming — starting with a complicated “quota hours” system in 2007 and moving to unlimited streaming in 2008. By 2010, the majority of subscribers were streaming something, and the company began offering streaming-only subscriptions, though CEO Reed Hastings said that same year that the company would keep shipping DVDs until 2030. (We’ll see about that.)

ABC was the first network to sell episodes of its shows on iTunes, back in 2006, and to stream shows free with ads on ABC.com — and later on AOL. But by the time premium subscription service Hulu Plus launched in 2010, the platforms getting the attention were devices with built-in access, like Internet-enabled TVs, Blu-ray players, and tablets.

Return of the living dead

Speaking of AOL: It’s something of a miracle that the company still exists. In 2000, when it merged with Time Warner, it was valued at $350 billion, and the next year, more than 24 million people in the U.S. were paying for its Internet access service. By the end of last year, that number had dwindled to just 3.3 million subscribers. Here’s a quick recap of some of AOL’s miscues over the years:

• AOL Voicemail ($5.95 per month)
• A teen service called Red (featuring “a talking head—using the image of an actual employee—that uses software to answer users’ questions”)
• A digital music partnership with Burger King
• A reality show called “Gold Rush”
• Social networking site AIM Pages
• Going free
• The hyperlocal Patch blogs

Though AOL was once a high flier, no other company ever liked it quite enough to buy it. Google bought a five-percent, $1 billion stake in AOL in 2005, leading analysts to wonder if Microsoft missed out. That resulted in a $726 million writedown in 2009. Time Warner bought back Google’s stake and finally spun off “the albatross” in December 2009.  AOL is still promising a bounceback. “The executive team expects a profitable content business by next year,” CEO Tim Armstrong said in May 2011.

Yahoo hasn’t fared much better. The company launched Yahoo Platinum in 2003; for $9.95 a month, subscribers got access to audio and videos.  The program was dead by October of that same year. It later tried a Twitter-wannabe microblogging service (“Meme…where you share everything that you find that’s interesting,”). Perhaps the smartest move Yahoo ever made was not buying AOL.

Where did these companies go wrong? In 2010, former Time Warner CEO Gerald Levin pondered that question in an interview with the New York Times . The AOL-Time Warner deal was “undone by the Internet itself,” he said. “I think it’s something that no one could have foreseen, and to this day, whether Apple is going to dominate entertainment or whether Amazon is going to dominate publishing, all the old business plans are out the window. How do you get paid for content?”

Know what’s cool? A billion dollars

In 2006, an RBC Capital analyst estimated that a certain social networking company would be worth $15 billion in a few years, based on “raw, unprecedented user/usage growth.”

Six years later, Facebook went public with a valuation of $104 billion. Too bad the analyst wasn’t talking about Facebook but about MySpace. The social networking company that Rupert Murdoch acquired for $580 million in 2005 sold for just $35 million in 2011.

Why did Facebook soar while MySpace — and other social networking services like Friendster — sank? It allowed people to build real connections using their actual personal information, and rolled out a product that was ready to scale and had good technology. Other companies realized sharing was important too — in 2005, Yahoo SVP Jeff Weiner called sharing “the next chapter of the World Wide Web” — but Facebook was able to implement it in a way that kept users coming back. The site surpassed Yahoo and AOL for “stickiness” in 2009, when Nielsen found users spending an average of four hours and thirty-nine minutes a month on Facebook.

Social has already disrupted some industries — witness the rise of Twitter and the way it has changed the way news is reported, with stories like Osama Bin Laden’s assassination breaking there first. In a sign of the importance of these emerging platforms, newspapers like the Wall Street Journal and New York Times are launching “Everywhere” initiatives to deliver news to readers where they are already hanging out.

Fast food and music don’t mix

Hard to believe it now, but there was real skepticism that iTunes’ 99-cent songs would be able to compete with peer-to-peer file-sharing services. “According to academics who’ve studied the economics of digital music distribution,” we wrote in 2003, the year iTunes launched, “the cost still seems too high to attract users of peer-to-peer file trading services.” The piece cited an economist who believed “the appropriate price of a downloaded song is 18 cents.” In fact, Real Networks dropped its song prices to $0.49 in an attempt to compete against Apple.

In the end, consumers choose selection and convenience over P2P networks. We called iTunes “a kickstart for the micropayments industry.” Was it? While Steve Jobs said in 2004 that Apple wouldn’t hit its one-year, 100 million songs downloaded goal, global digital music sales crossed $1.1 billion in 2006. In April 2008, Apple surpassed Walmart  as the largest music seller in the United States.

The company that arguably started the digital music revolution — Napster — didn’t survive. Once it no longer offered “free,” it was done, though it tried to reincarnate itself: launching a mobile music service, “Napster To Go,” with AT&T in 2004 (the one smartphone that supported it could hold up to 6 songs), partnering with Circuit City on a digital music store, getting itself acquired by Best Buy in 2008 ,and then being bought back by Rhapsody in 2011. Unfortunately, Rhapsody was already losing out to newer (and free) streaming services like Pandora and Spotify.

The partnerships with Circuit City and Best Buy, though, were probably the kiss of death. One of the big trends of the past 10 years has been brick-and-mortar retail stores’ consistent failure to compete effectively against digital-native companies. Best Buy wasn’t the only retailer to try to crack the digital-content business — and fail: Target and Sears both took a shot. And McDonald’s sold digital content over its WiFi network and even tried DVD rentals in its restaurants.

Do you like the feel of paper?

Just as digital music didn’t really take off until Apple introduced the iPod, the ebook revolution didn’t take place until the arrival of the Kindle. In paidContent’s early years, ebooks were written off as a failure in part because publishers couldn’t figure out what to do with DRM. (In 2003, “temporary electronic ink” that would disappear after a few months was floated as a possible solution.) Barnes & Noble decided to stop selling ebooks in 2003, and Yahoo stopped selling them in 2004.

Meanwhile, Amazon and Google were pushing forward. Google launched Google Print – now called Google Book Search, and still besieged by lawsuits seven years later. Amazon tested two now-defunct programs: Amazon Pages, which allowed customers to buy access to digital copies of select pages from books, and Amazon Upgrade, which bundled print books with online access to the complete work.

Customers weren’t biting. Then Amazon came out with the Kindle in 2007 for $399. Less than two years later, Amazon was selling more Kindle books than print books, and ebooks now make up over 20 percent of some big-six publishers’ sales. Barnes & Noble has had some success with its Nook e-reader and digital bookstore, but bankrupt Borders shuttered all its stores in 2011. Meanwhile, the Department of Justice suit against Apple and five big publishers for allegedly colluding to set e-book prices drags on.

Good thing Steve Jobs looked beyond ringtones

A Forbes survey back in 2002 found that “business professionals” would be willing to pay for “news content to be delivered to their cellular devices,” and some media companies tried early mobile experiments. Verizon offered a cell phone version of the Yellow Pages — which, at $19.95 per year, gained 15,000 subscribers in three months. But starting in 2004, everyone decided the future was in ringtones. A $4 billion global business by the end of the year, one company projected.

So, so many ringtones. You could buy them from Rolling Stone or from an ATM-like device called E2Go. A fall 2004 marketing campaign let you mix your own ringtones on Levi’s website. Billboard launched a top ringtones chart.

Could ringtones “prove to be a passing fad”? we wondered late in 2004. Luckily, yes — a new technology came along to shake up the mobile market. No, it wasn’t the $500 ESPN phone, but the iPhone, which came out in 2007. And by opening its platform up to third-party app developers, Apple got users ready for its next ecosystem-changing device, the iPad, in 2010.

Monetizing mobile

Advertising has always been a fuzzy business — how exactly do you measure engagement and success? Well, that’s still the big debate about advertising in the digital era.  ”If here’s anything that’s really holding back ad spending on the web, it’s the lack of good measurements,” Tim Armstrong, then Google’s VP of national sales, said in 2007.

Mobile advertising has also faced obstacles. In 2006, mobile carriers began allowing advertising despite fears of annoying customers. Customers were indeed annoyed – 79 percent of them found mobile advertising annoying, according to a 2007 Forrester study — but they could “see the potential benefits of mobile advertising and marketing to themselves,” particularly if they could get a useful special offer or coupon.

Further complicating matters for advertisers: The smartphone market is fragmented among different brands — marketers don’t want to spend the money to create different ads for Android and iOS — and there are two mobile ad universes: mobile browser and apps.

Nevertheless, mobile advertising has gained ground, crossing  $1 billion in the U.S. for the first time in 2011, according to the Interactive Advertising Bureau, totaling $1.6 billion for the year.

The next opportunity is social media advertising. And once again, it will be a challenge to figure out some standardized metrics. What’s a retweet worth, anyways?

Back to where we all began

Though micropayments worked well for music when Apple launched iTunes, the path to payments for written content has been rockier. In 2004, we wrote that “micropayments today are still characterized by a large number of competing transaction types” – including direct-to-bill, merchant aggregation, prepaid accounts and direct transfer – and “each of these face the current incumbent in digital content distribution: the flat-fee subscription model.”

Eight years later, it appears that the subscription model has won out. The iPad opened the door for magazine and newspaper publishers to create new revenue selling content on that platform, but the results have been mixed. When Rupert Murdoch’s “The Daily” iPad newspaper launched in early 2011, the company called it “the model for how stories are told and consumed.” We wrote, “The bet here is that while consumers are less and less likely to reach into their pocket for a few quarters to buy a newspaper, they might not care about the 14 cents on their credit card for a copy of an e-newspaper.” A year and a half later, The Daily has over 100,000 paying subscribers — but it’s living on borrowed time and may not get through the five years its publisher has said it needs to break even.

Writing for the web, of course, has been around for awhile. At the beginning of the decade, blogging was called “nanopublishing,” and the question was how blogs could support themselves doing it. All sorts of models have arisen. For example, Gawker tried a licensing deal with Yahoo, but that relationship ended a year later. The deal “garnered way more attention than we expected, but less traffic,” Gawker CEO Nick Denton said in 2006.

Some bloggers have stayed independent and make a living from advertising (or from their day job); others write their blogs under a newspaper, website or larger magazine’s umbrella — see the Dish’s Andrew Sullivan, FiveThirtyEight’s Nate Silver, WaPo’s Ezra Klein. Or, they go to work for the Huffington Post!

Magazine companies have grappled with whether to bundle digital editions with print subscriptions or charge for them separately. Time Inc. — which first put digital editions of its magazines behind AOL’s paywall in 2003 — started out charging separately, but today Time Inc. and Condé Nast print subscribers get the digital edition free. Hearst, meanwhile, is charging separately, and it said its digital business in the U.S. became “solidly profitable” for the first time in 2011.

Could there ever be a Netflix for magazines? Time tried it for print versions with its 2008 Maghound service. It failed, due to a lack of marketing and reader interest. Magazine publishers are trying again with joint venture Next Issue Media.

Many newspaper publishers, most notably the New York Times, tried paywalls at the start of the decade and then abandoned them – only to return to the model in the past couple years.  In its most recent earnings report, the NYT said it has 454,000 digital subscribers. Is that enough to sustain the newspaper in its 21st-century transition?  Probably the best answer to that came from  Vivian Schiller. But it was in response not to the NYT’s recent digital subscriber numbers, but to the NYT’s decision in 2004 to close the paper’s first paywall, known as TimesSelect. Schiller, then the SVP and general manager of NYTimes.com, was asked whether TimesSelect had worked.  “It did work,” she said. “It’s just a matter of as compared to what.”

Birthday cake photo courtesy of Shutterstock user [Robyn Mackenzie].

TV photo courtesy of Shutterstock user [Somchai Buddha].

Zombie hand photo courtesy of Shutterstock user [lineartestpilot].

Piggybank photo courtesy of Shutterstock user [cardiae]

Fast food photo courtesy of Shutterstock user [Sergio Martinez].

Book photo courtesy of Shutterstock user [TrotzOlga].

Ringtones and apps photo courtesy of Shutterstock user [violetkaipa].

Cash register photo courtesy of Shutterstock user [titelio].

Magazines photo courtesy of Shutterstock user [bernashafo].

Spotify told Bloomberg it has “no announcements to share at this time,” but:

The new format would be similar to Pandora’s, which operates like radio and is cheaper to operate because royalty rates are lower and set by Congress.

The new service would start by year-end and be supported by advertising, said the people, who weren’t authorized to talk publicly. The company has begun notifying some content partners of its plans, they said.

In the most recent figures released, Spotify said it has 10 million registered users worldwide and three million paying subscribers. Pandora has 150 million registered users.

Spotify already offers a radio feature on its desktop app, but it is not mobile yet.

Bloomberg explains Pandora users “have access to any artist whose music has been published, because the service operates under federal rules. Royalties paid by Pandora and other online radio companies are set by the Copyright Royalty Board, a division of the Library of Congress.” So a radio service would allow Spotify to offer some music it doesn’t have the rights to already, and could also pull needed advertisers to the platform.

According to an article in Bloomberg, Pandora already attracts more listeners in big cities like New York and Los Angeles the cities’ biggest radio stations, but even so, analysts do not think that the service will be profitable until 2014.

Pandora today runs a streaming service that lets users listen to listener-generated radio stations, which it offers on a free, unlimited basis with ads running alongside the service. It competes most closely with the likes of Last.fm and is unlike services like Spotify, Rhapsody, Mog and Rdio, which offer users the ability to listen to specific music on-demand, and features subscription tiers starting at around $10/month that give users extra features, such as ad-free listening, mobile access and offline listening.

Although Pandora also works via PCs, the fact that it gets so much of its traffic from mobile platforms means that this is the area that the company will need to look at more closely if investors are not happy with those profitability prospects. And it seems as if they are not: increased competition from Spotify and the others, combined with the short-term profit issues, have shaved 16 percent off the company’s stock since it went public in June of this year.

Pandora hasn’t said it will pivot its service, but you do have to wonder if that could be on the cards. Mobile advertising, which looks like the most obvious revenue generator today, is definitely growing, but possibly not fast enough, and not in the formats that Pandora uses on its site, which range from display ads and video spots, to short audio clips, aimed at both local and national advertisers.

Mobile ads are forecast to generate revenues of $3.3 billion this year worldwide, according to Gartner. And depending on whether you trust Gartner or eMarketer’s figures more, the U.S. alone will bring in either $701.7 million or $1.23 billion. But with a large portions of that advertising coming in the form of search and maps revenues (great news for Google), as well as the old-fashioned format of messaging (that is, apps coming via SMS or picture messages) that doesn’t leave much to share among the many apps and mobile web sites looking for revenues from display and rich-media formats like video and audio clips.

According to Morgan Stanley, Pandora currently gets $20 in mobile advertising for each hour of music provided to listeners, and it will not offset music licensing fees with mobile advertising until 2016, when each hour of mobile music will generate $40, compared to the $23 in licensing fees it will get at that time, a rise of 35 percent on today’s rates. When the company filed its IPO it disclosed that half its revenues get eaten up by copyright royalties on music.

Pandora currently has 23 million active users and Morgan Stanley believes that this base could reach 159 million by 2021. If the company continues with its existing business model for the next decade, the analysts believe that Pandora will be listening to the service for an average of 18 hours per month by 2021, compared to 13 hours in 2010.

But even that raises another issue: whether Pandora can scale up its sales staff to meet that growth.

“It’s really tough to grow our sales organization 125 percent year-over-year,” noted CFO Steve Cakebread, speaking at an investor conference in September.

Although Pandora first debuted with an international service several years ago, it shuttered its international operation over music royalty issues and seems to have put those plans on ice for now.

“This is the most intractable problem of all,” Pandora’s CEO said in March. “It might be there’s simply no chasm bigger than the fundamentally global nature of the internet, and copyright which is still terribly parochial. We’ll be tripping over that, potentially not just for years to come but for decades to come. I wish I could say something more hopeful on that topic.”

The claim is based on a 1988 state law called the Video Rental Protection Act that imposes fines for disclosing a customer’s purchase or rental histories related to videos, books or sound recordings. The law is a more robust version of a federal one passed the same year after a newspaper created a privacy flap by publishing the video rental history of a Supreme Court nominee. That federal law, which some regard as a relic of the analog era, has been back in the news because it is preventing Netflix (NSDQ: NFLX) from participating in Facebook’s recently announced news ticker feature.

In the Pandora case, first reported this week, subscribers claim the radio service violated the law when it permitted anyone on the Internet to view their profile pages. These pages, which Pandora had said would only be visible to a limited number of other subscribers, contained information like a person’s user name and musical preferences. The lawsuit says Pandora committed a second violation when it merged users’ accounts with their Facebook accounts without notifying them. It says this forced integration “released sensitive listening information to all its users’ Facebook friends.”

The lawsuit, which was filed in California, seeks statutory penalties of $5000 for every Pandora subscriber in Michigan and another $5000 for those same subscribers whose accounts were merged with Facebook. If a judge agrees to let the class action go forward, Pandora and the plaintiffs will likely settle out of court for an undisclosed amount.

This is not the first time Pandora has been caught up in a privacy class action. In the past year, it has been sued over allegations it shared personal information that it obtained from its Apple (NSDQ: AAPL) and Android apps. Pandora has had a rocky time of it since going public in June. The money-losing company hit an opening day high of $26 per share but its stock has since bumped along closer to the $13 level.

The case may also be a cautionary tale for another Internet radio service, Spotify, which came under fire this week for forcing its users to access their account through Facebook.